Transcript of ‘Dialogue Works’ edition of 17 December

Transcript submitted by a reader

Nima R. Alkhorshid: 0:05
Hi everybody, today is Tuesday, December 17th and our friend, Dr. Gilbert Doctorow is back with us. Welcome back, Gilbert.

Gilbert Doctorow, PhD:
Good to be with you.

Alkhorshid:
Let's get started, Gilbert, with what's going on in the Middle East. In your opinion, what's right now, what would be the Russian policy in the Middle East after this crisis, the toppling of Assad regime in the Middle East in Syria?

Doctorow:
So all the Western media have been celebrating for the last week or more the demise of Assad, his government, and which is seen as a great loss for the Russians, a black eye for Putin and so forth. That's understandable. That's in line with the overall propaganda. Anything that could be presented as being bad for Russia has to get first page attention of newspapers, because it takes your mind off of the disaster that's going on day by day in Ukraine, which I assume we'll talk about soon.

1:12
But this is dead wrong. And what has happened and the analyses that I've heard from some of the guests on your show and other leading interview programs have caused me to reflect a little bit about what I was saying on the Russian activities in 2015, 2017, when they, as we all know, saved the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Was that what they were doing? And have the Russians lost Syria?

Well, first of all, you can't lose something that you don't own. And that has to be taken as a first point. Syria was not a Russian possession to lose. If the Russians didn't take control of Syria in some important way, then what were they doing there 2015 to 17? And couldn't you say that the Russians' failure to respond to Israeli air raids over Syria or to any other complications like the Americans' continued presence in the southeast of Syria, their support for the Kurds. Russians didn't do anything about this. What does that tell you?

2:34
It causes you to go back to first principles. What were the Russians doing there altogether? And I'd say, in light of these developments, my rereading of the Russian activity in the Syrian civil war was they were there to fight the Islamic government, the Islamic caliphate. And they were doing it not for the benefit of Bashar al-Assad. They were doing it for themselves, because let's recollect, this movement, ISIS, was deeply ideological and had great ambitions for controlling not just the Middle East, but influence on the Russian Caucasus. So Russia was there to destroy ISIS, to protect itself from a contagious and very dangerous ideology and movement, dangerous to its control of its southern borders.

3:38
And they succeeded. America said it was doing the same thing, it was fighting ISIS, which was rubbish. The Americans were there, twiddling their thumbs much of the time, until they were challenged by the Russians to do something also. Then when the Russians smashed ISIS by their very heavy air bombardment and by coordinated action with Syrian proxies on the ground, then the Americans claimed victory over ISIS.

That was all false. The Russian presence was there, as I said, on very limited basis. And they had no formal obligations to prop up the Assad government. De facto, they offered their assistance in 2018, I understand, and Assad rejected it. He was keeping his options open.

4:33
This is something, these issues are overlooked, intentionally overlooked by those who want to simplify into black and white. The Russians have been very cautious dealing with Middle Eastern countries because of-- I mean as far as North as Turkey and as far East as Iran-- because these countries all have been duplicitous. They all have potentially, if given the opportunity, stabbed their allies in the back for the sake of opportunism and a quick gain.

Opportunism in the whole area has spelled one thing: the United States offering to relieve the sanctions or otherwise make life easier for one or another country that it has been bullying for decades. Iran, after the death - the murder of their president Raisi, has been a rather slippery object with the appeal, the outreach to the West, to the United States. That was one of the first activities of the incoming new head of the Iranian government. And the Russians saw that. It failed.

6:00
That is to say, they got the back-of-the-hand treatment from the States. There was the attack on Hezbollah's chief within his visit for the inauguration. And they understood in Tehran that the West was not their friend. It had no intention of becoming their friend, and so they backed away. And again, they were very hotly pursuing Moscow for conclusion of this comprehensive cooperation agreement, which includes a big mutual defense [component].

Alkhorshid: 6:37
You mean Hamas chief?

Doctorow:

Yes, the Hamas chief, exactly. So the Russians have been cautious with Iran, and the Russians certainly were cautious with Assad. And reasonably, as I have learned from some of these latest interviews by people who know profoundly more than I did about the Syrian-Russian relations, Syrian-US relations, that the Russians even entertained replacing Assad in 2011.

This was something I wasn't aware of, but it adds to the general background. These sides have been like two scorpions engaging one another. There was no real certainty that their interests were more than for a period of useful time and no more. So the Russians, as I said, had nothing to lose in Syria because they didn't own it.

Now as for the bases, of course a lot of tension is there, but the Russians have reportedly removed a lot of staff they had in Damascus, military staff and others. They have concentrated their presence in Syria in these two bases, an air base and a naval base, Tartus and Khamenei.

8:02
But will they stay there? Only if it's clear that they are welcome and secure. What is the position of the Damascus government-in-formation with respect to Russia? It's not at all clear. The only thing that's perfectly clear is that the EU visitors and those who are speaking for Brussels have made it clear by megaphone diplomacy that they will not deal with Damascus until and unless Damascus pushes the Russians out of Syria. So the presence of Russians in Syria is possible, but not necessarily going to be realized.

8:54
And the Russians have other options, which they must be very actively pursuing right now. Simple options, which I've mentioned a week ago, whether it be Iran or Algeria or Egypt. So the Russians will not be removed from the Mediterranean, that's for sure. And there's very little, almost no discussion on Russian state television of what is happening in Syria. Surely, it is a source of embarrassment, only because the West is doing everything possible in its mainstream propaganda to make it appear to be a Russian loss.

9:37
And of course, there are those Russians who ask reasonably, is it true, can it be that our government has been outmaneuvered and outdone by US and Israeli diplomacy and military action in Syria? And of course, Turkish. So we are waiting. Thursday, Mr. Putin makes his annual direct-call program. That is, the whole nation has the possibility of submitting questions to him either by email or by telephone messages, whatever. One million people are said to have left with the call center their questions for their president. And people are asking, "Will he allow questions about Syria to be directed to him?" and "Will he answer them?" Well, the first already tells you about the second.

10:42
He has every possibility to ensure that such embarrassing questions are not posed, but perhaps he will take it. In his very important speech yesterday, which got a lot of attention in mainstream media, the speech before the Ministry of Defense was the year-end gathering of maybe 300 senior military officers and a goodly number of important other government officials, civilian government officials, including the representatives of all the Duma parties, Communists and the Just Russia and of course the United Russia. They were all present as he gave his summary of what they've achieved and what lies ahead. But Syria did not have any role whatsoever in that speech.

Alkhorshid: 11:44
When you look at the bigger picture of what's going on in Syria and how important Syria is for them or the project Belt and Road Initiative of China. And do you think that the Russians are now concerned about the North-South Corridor? Because they can do something to Russia as well. Or the relationship between Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran is that good, that they're not concerned about it?

12:17
They all have very strong economic interests in success in that quadrant. If you're looking at Azerbaijan as the weak link, I wouldn't, because they are very closely aligned with Russia. Their interests do not always coincide, of course, Azerbaijan is a competitor on world markets with Russian hydrocarbons, but that does not take away from the reality of their close personal associations.

Aliyev, after all, I think he graduated from the elite foreign policy school in Moscow. In any case, he's a fluent Russian speaker. And he may be very polite and inviting to Western visitors, but there's no way that they could prise him away from his economic and geopolitical relationship with Russia. As for Iran, this is very important to them. It gives them serious economic importance in the region, and it facilitates better relations with India, of course, because India is the main beneficiary at the end of the pipeline, at the end of the North-South Corridor for the traffic.

13:44
So traffic that goes not just to Russia, but traffic that goes into Central Asia also. This is a multipurpose north-south route with many beneficiaries. Just like the question of relations with Erdogan, it's inconceivable that any misunderstanding or mutual dislike that comes out of what Erdogan has done in Syria will interfere with the very deep economic shared interests that Turkey has with Russia. These are bigger than individuals.

Alkhorshid: 14:22
And we've learned from the president of Iran that since they took power in Iran, they were working closely with Russians in various groups in order to-- this new agreement that they're going to sign in, if I'm not mistaken, by January 25th in Russia.

And do you feel that right now, the new government in Iran, you mentioned that with the case of Ismail Hanee in Iran, the assassination, do you think, how do you find the behavior of the government in Iran? Do you think, are they getting to the point that they have to be closer to Russia, China and the East?

Doctorow:
Well, a lot-- you'll notice that this is scheduled for five days after the inauguration of Trump, and he is a central figure in the calculations that Iran must be making today. Do they want to genuinely throw their lot in with Russia and with China, of course? Or are they going to seek greater economic benefit and geopolitical benefit by an outreach and accommodation to the Americans? As things look now, there would be no reason for Tehran to expect an accommodation with Mr. Trump.

Now, that could be a misreading. because he may, as I have said elsewhere and other writings of mine, it may be that Mr. Trump has concentrated the most loudmouth and ill-mannered America-First people who are keen on wars with China and with uncoupling the axis of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. It could be that he is genuinely sympathetic to these ideas and therefore has appointed them. Or it could be, as I think more likely, that he has gathered them all in one place so they're under his tight control and all beholden to him, so they cannot double-cross him in public space.

16:47
And that his intention is, after a decent four or six months, to make an outreach to Iran. That cannot be dismissed. But if you are in a situation as Iran is today, you'll be playing, taking a very risky route if you were to decline a close economic, military, and other more general cooperation with Russia, which is just before you, and to have nothing in your hands while waiting for a clarification on what Mr. Trump is actually going to do. It would be taking a very big risk that you're caught, particularly caught at this very moment, when the protection you had from air defenses in Syria have now been completely obliterated, when there was a free flight zone over Syria for attacking US and Israeli aircraft intent on doing the kind of destruction in your country as they have done elsewhere in the Middle East in the last year.

Therefore, I don't think that they have a big anguish over this decision. I think they will go ahead and sign up with Russia and make the best of it.

Alkhorshid: 18:18
We know how the Biden administration is obsessed with the conflict in Ukraine. In my opinion, one of the main reasons for what's going on in Syria was the war in Ukraine, because they wanted, before leaving Washington, they wanted to inflict some sort of suffering for to Russia. And do you think that, the way that the Biden administration is continuing in their support for Ukraine, do you think that what is going on in their mind right now? Because we know that Trump even recently in his talk with the press, he said that he wants to put an end, he wants a deal in Ukraine. But after all, what's happening right now in the mind of the Biden administration?

Doctorow: 19:11
Well, we've understood for some time that Biden, these last two months, now it's down to one month, wants to ensure his legacy. And one way to do that, the legacy has not just an international affairs dimension, but I think more importantly for him personally, it's domestic affairs. His Biden economics is a belief that he has created a much more prosperous America, even though Americans voters didn't understand that, it didn't resonate with them.

Nonetheless, he believes that the country is economically much stronger because of the various legislative actions that he got through Congress, the vast amount of money, debt money that he has distributed for the sake of new and coming technologies and by his pursuit of the containment on China.

20:12
Nonetheless, he is in these last weeks doing as much as possible on the international front to create, to embroil the incoming administration in foreign-affairs problems that will distract them, which will absorb their attention, and keep them away, keep Mr. Trump away during the honeymoon period of any new government, any new administration from the vast domestic reforms, changes, reversal of everything Biden did that Trump has otherwise declared in his pre-electoral messages.

So there are at least two dimensions here, two sides to what Biden is doing. One is on the face of it, yes, to so provoke the Russians that he hopes they will do something that makes it impossible for Trump to pursue a peace agreement, because the whole American society will be too riled by what the Russians have just done. And what could they do is attack a NATO asset or US asset in Europe or the Middle East as retaliation for these various missile strikes on their territory.

21:42
So he's hoping for that, finally to break the restraint of Mr. Putin and compel him to do something irresponsible that ruins the peace initiative of Trump. And to keep Trump away from his domestic policies, because he will be busy full-time gathering support in Congress to deal with a new Russian threat.

Alkhorshid: 22:13
I think when it comes to any sort of deal, we have to consider what's the reality of the battleground right now, and how they can negotiate on these terms that maybe, the terms that Russia would put on the table. Because Donald Trump, I don't see he has ... he's going to get along with Zelensky's plan, because that's not a viable choice. What is the reality on the ground right now?

Doctorow: 22:42
Well, just to come back to your last remark before I discuss the situation on the ground The issue that appears in the last few days is that Trump perhaps has gotten the message that Ukraine, the Ukraine war is bigger than Ukraine. And the real issue that has to be addressed for the Russians to sit down at the table and negotiate is with the Americans directly over a new architecture of security in Europe. I think that message is sinking in, in the Trump camp. And if so, then definitely the Russians will be very pleased to enter negotiations. Even if the starting point, the compromises on the terms of settlement with Kiev, are not acceptable to them. But they will sit down if they are satisfied that the big issue of overall security in Europe is being recognized as worthy of discussion with Washington directly.

23:47
Now, the situation on the ground. It gets more dire every day for the Ukrainians. And the more I see Russian television reporting, and the more we listen to what Putin said yesterday, he gave numbers. He said that the Ukrainians have lost to dead and wounded 500,000 men this year. And that adds to the 500,000 they lost last year.

So when Mr. Trump is speaking about a million men dead or wounded, wounded in the sense of seriously disabled, that's just Ukraine alone. And that's quite dramatic. Now as to what's going on day by day, the latest came out on Russian news yesterday is that the average, I think this was actually incorporated in Putin's speech, that the average daily gain now is 30 square kilometers, the gain of the Russians on the front.

24:48
They also mentioned during the course of yesterday's briefing with the Ministry of Defense that the Ukrainians' forces on the front line, the individual units, are only 45 percent manned. That's to say, they have experienced such losses they cannot fill their military units, not to mention the units that exist only on paper, because they've been totally destroyed. For that reason, the Russian advances are so significant. And if you look at the map that they put up, you see how they are closing in and creating cauldrons, as they call them, pockets, where they have entrapped significant numbers of Ukrainian forces, and how they're advancing on Pokrovsk, which may be taken in the near future. I think it's called Krasnoarmeisk in Russian.

25:50
And so if you look at maps, you won't find Pokrovsk any more. It's because the Russians are satisfied it's under their command, and they have restored its pre-Maidan name of Krasnoarmeisk. That is important in ways that weren't even discussed before. Not only is this a logistics hub essential to supplying Ukrainian forces with Western equipment and ammunition that's coming in from the Lvov area.

But it also was an important center for Ukrainian metallurgy, since it was the largest, almost unique source of coking coal for smelters. So this town, which was 60,000 in number before the onset of the hostilities, is now partly occupied. They're entering from nearby, from two, three kilometers away. They're entering, Russian forces are entering the city. And in a matter of weeks, how much time it takes depends on how much destruction they have to do of high-rise buildings where snipers are hiding out and so forth. But they will take it. It's clear as day. And when they do that, then the road is open.

27:18
As Mr. Trump was saying yesterday, how flat the land is there. Yes, it is flat, except for some elevations. And once they have Pokrovsk, then they will be rolling westward towards these significant towns, significant from 2014 when they were the points of resistance of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Donbas to the Ukrainian military forces that were attacking them at the outbreak of the civil war. And this is Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. Once they reach that, there are more than about 60 percent across what is the Donetsk region, or as it's called, Republic.

28:11
The two main regions of Donbass are Lugansk and Donetsk. Lugansk is 98 percent held by the Russians. But Donetsk has been the tough case. It was tough in every respect. The biggest fortifications of the Ukrainians were in Donetsk. The closest they came to population centers were in Donetsk, until six, eight months ago.

They were in easy artillery range and shelling daily Donetsk city, which is the capital of the region, with loss of life and large destruction of residential neighborhoods as the evident damage. Till they were pushed back a few months ago, beyond artillery range, and now, as I say, the westward movement of the Russian forces is bringing them to the middle point-- that's east-west middle, divide in the Donetsk region-- and then it’s a clean sweep from there to the Dnieper River. That is all within reach. Now, you would think, ah, of course they could do this tomorrow. Well, they can't do this tomorrow because there are residual forces. I didn't say they were 90 percent depleted, I said they were 45 percent.

29:34
And they do have drones, they do have mines, they have ways of making it essential that Russians do a lot of cleanup work before they bring troops in on the ground, lest they be devastated by these means of attack that the Ukrainians still have. But it's clear which way the war is going. And the Russians are very confident, in high spirits. We also note, again, turning to the question of manpower, everybody is talking now, Washington made a great point on how the Ukrainians have to recruit, reduce the mobilization age to 18 from 25 and bring up their numbers because we've given them so many supplies, but they don't have the soldiers.

30:27
Well, the Russians, again came out in yesterday's briefing that Putin and Belousov, the Minister of Defense, delivered to the assembled generals and political leaders in Moscow, that the Russians recruited, kontraktniki as they call them, these are their signup volunteer soldiers who are paid, they're paid rather handsomely upon signing a contract for six months service on the front lines.

They're paid between 8,000 and 10,000 euros. They sign up, and then they receive a rather handsome monthly salary for the time that they're actually at the front. Last year it was 300,000. Now as we're in mid-December, it will be 400,000 this year. 400,000 people have signed up.

31:24
They were not mobilized. They weren't in a war with the draft administrators as goes on in Ukraine, they came in voluntarily either as patriots and also some people, let's be honest about it, were motivated by the very handsome compensation this offered for those who sign up as kontraktniki. For them, personally, for their families, the benefits of being a volunteer soldier in the Russian Army fighting in the special military operation on Ukrainian territory includes a lot of benefits for the family, for the children. The children are assured scholarships to the best universities or higher educational institutions in the country. The families are given highly subsidized mortgage loans for housing.

32:28
There are a lot of benefits that come with this, as well as a lot of pride, because the Putin government is promising that those who fight, those who show their valor in the field of battle, will become the elite of the new Russia. They will be held, he is holding out to them positions of importance in the local administrations across the country, and of course in the military if they choose to pursue a military career.

And if, as one of these heroes of Russia told Putin in their direct one-to-one conversation when the awards were given out, that "I don't feel prepared for this type of honor, because I really wasn't properly educated." And Putin told him, "Well, we'll educate you. We'll ensure that you have what it takes, and we will give you experience in local administration, so that you can be given and properly deserve a position of authority for the whole future, for your future career."

33:41
So this encouragement, this intention to restore to the Russian military the social position that they had in the 19th century, when every provincial noble family, whether poor or otherwise, the mothers all were hoping that their daughters would marry an officer, that type of status of patriotic young men will be rewarded with elite status in the new Russia, the post-Putin Russia.

Alkhorshid: 34:23
If you were to mention the main terms for any sort of negotiations right now for Russians, what would that be? And because in my opinion, right now, what's going on right now in Russia with the terrorist attack, with the recent terrorist attack in which General Kerillov with his aide were killed. Is terrorism a concern for Russia coming from Ukraine?

Doctorow: 34:53
Well, it has been for a long time. Remember this Crocus Entertainment Center, which was very important to public consciousness because it was carried out by central Asian hirelings of Ukraine and turned a lot of attention of Russian society to
"What are all these central Asians doing in our midst? Are they really trustworthy?” So the notion of the connection between-- and of course there are a series of other high visibility assassinations. The Daria Dugina, the daughter of this philosopher, politician, political thinker in Moscow who was a journalist and who was blown up. These are in public mind. Ukraine is closely linked, associated in Russian consciousness with terrorism.

35:54
The incursion into Kursk region was initially described as an act of terror. Its tactical or even strategic dimension was not seen at once by the Russians. And by the Russians, I mean by the Kremlin, And it was described as a terror act. So this falls in line, what we just learned about today falls in line with this side. Perhaps it's the only successful, in quotation marks, activity of the Zelensky grouping, gang. Certainly they are not succeeding well on the battlefield.

36:45
But these things go hand in hand. Generally speaking, terrorism is an act of the losers, an act of those who do not have the wherewithal to conduct a proper military campaign.

Alkhorshid:
How do you see, do you think that what has happened in Georgia would make Russians happy, the Russian government happy or there's still a lot of work to be done in Georgia? They're still having some sort of concerns in Georgia.

Doctorow:
Well, the Georgian case is interesting, because it shows that Maidan is not something that can be transplanted easily, even if all the elements are there down to the tiny details like distributing cookies in the street, to those who were striking against the government.

The outstanding feature of what's happened, or what is happening in Georgia, is the resolute-ness, the competence, the clear-mindedness of the Georgia Dream government, prime minister. This was not to be expected. And let us remember that the whole affair is an internal Georgian matter in which Russians are an interested party, but not an active party. The question is, will Georgia have any semblance of sovereignty, or does it just become another proxy warrior against Russia, following instructions from Brussels and Brussels following instructions from Washington? That is the issue.

38:30
The notion that the Georgia Dream Party wants to be a Russian ally, a Russian subject, is total nonsense. This disposition of the party is to become part of the EU community. Lord knows why they want to join the losing side, but that's their business. The point is that their public position is to join the EU. But they will not join the EU under the terms of the present EU diktat, which is that they undo their law on foreign agents, which-- some European countries have similar. Of course, It all started in the States in the 1920s.

39:17
And those laws are still on the books in the States. The issue of foreign agents is well, very clear. It's the means by which George Soros and the pro-Democracy agencies, NGOs are able to subvert governments. And the Georgian government, the Georgia Dream Party was insisting that it will not allow subversion, that it will expose all channels of funding for sedition, and that they will not withdraw the law for the sake of furthering their admission to the EU. So the EU is acting with a fist and destroying its chances of influence over a government that is at heart sympathetic to the EU, but not sympathetic to being treated like slaves.

Alkhorshid: 40:21
In my opinion, the day that the European Union decides to change its policy toward Ukraine, what they've been doing to Russia for more than three, for almost three years, it's going to fire back at them because-- the problems that they're making in Ukraine is going to backfire, if they stop sending more aid and weapons to Ukraine. And right now when you look at the situation in the European Union, we have two leaders, Fico and the Hungarian president Orban, they're willing to go after peace, go after some sort of negotiations with Russia. But in your opinion, are other European countries getting prepared for what's coming from the Trump administration and their policies?

Doctorow: 41:21
No, I think that it's insane. They don't know how to deal with this. Of course, you have to give them a little bit of forgiveness, because Trump has put these awful neocon people into his administration. And I don't think this was an accident. I know we gave one reason. He's getting to his gang, putting them all together in a room, and then he locks the door. There's more to it, though.

He is giving himself a second life insurance policy, besides having J.D. Vance as his vice president, that's his first life insurance policy. And this is the second one, because people really have a hard time reading: What is his intent? Has he really been deceiving us the whole time?

Us being the people who appear on your show and on similar programs in the alternative media, we have all assumed that Trump is our friend. And have we been taken for fools? That, just as we wonder about that, I think people in the EU wonder about that. Have they been fearing for no reason that Trump is going to be their enemy? He is being very American because he is creating muddy water in which everybody's fishing.

42:57
We don't know where he stands. We'll find out in the next month or two. And therefore, I think the Europeans are on the wait and see. Don't be terrified because it may not be as bad as it looks. But when they find out that it is as bad as it looks, then your question would be very appropriate. What are they going to do about it?

Alkhorshid: 43:18
Yeah. How about Romania, Gilbert? What's your understanding on what has happened and what's going on in Romania? And is that of importance for Russia?

Doctorow:
It's of great importance, because it is a weather vane for the EU's policies in general with respect to democracy within the EU and with respect to allowing the people to determine the policies of their separate governments. Is there any degree whatsoever of sovereignty in the 27 member states? That is the issue that's of great interest to the Russians, because they would like to believe that some of these leaders in countries are open to common sense and self-interest.

44:09
And that is the case in the candidate who unexpectedly came to the fore with the single largest body of votes, even if he didn't have a majority, and they were going to go into a runoff, the second round. Nonetheless, his ability to win out over the EU-paid and -sponsored defamation program against himself was of interest, of course, to Moscow. And then you have this judicial decision negating that first vote over alleged and unsubstantiated charges that Russian agents had corrupted the vote, has influenced the vote against the preferred candidates of Brussels.

45:07
So of course the Russians are following this closely to see what chances there are of finding some accommodation within the EU after the war ends.

Alkhorshid:
Before wrapping up, Gilbert, we had a statement from Erdogan, which we were talking about, laughing about it. He said something different. He said that there are two main, real leaders in the world, me and Putin. What I understand from this type of vision that he's looking toward the east, he's not looking toward the west. This comes to my mind when he's talking this way. Do you think that after all with all that difficulties that we're having in Syria and in the Middle East, the overall movement of Turkiye would be toward the East?

Doctorow: 46:15
Well, it's too early to say, As I mentioned a week ago, the Russians are not going to turn their back on him. They have very big projects that interest both Turkey and Russia equally. Therefore, it would be quite foolish to forego these very difficult to negotiate agreements over the gas hub, over the atomic power plant that the Russians are building and so forth.

So they will not turn their back on him. And they are interested in what he's going to do in Syria, what his next moves are, because it's not at all clear what kind of relationship he will have in practice in days ahead with Israel, how happy or unhappy he is with what they have been doing to devastate any semblance of armed forces in Syria and to create the way for total chaos in the country. It is not clear how Erdogan's conflict of interests with the United States in the Kurdish zone will be regulated now that Assad is out of the picture and the two sides are in direct confrontation over the fate of the Kurds in Syria. So the Russians will certainly be watching very closely. They don't close any doors.

47:48
Just as I say, they're not closing any doors on retaining or leaving their military bases in Latakia and in Tartus provinces. These are long, long games. And the parties have been present for decades and will be present for decades to come. The goal will depend on matching up interests and ambitions. Therefore, well, obviously he was saying what he was saying to ingratiate himself with Putin, although I don't think Putin is as keen on flattery as Mr. Erdogan is.

Alkhorshid:
Thank you so much, Gilbert, for being with us today. Great pleasure, as always.

Doctorow: 48:42
Thank you, Nima. I enjoyed it.