Postscript to the taking of Avdeevka
On last night’s edition of Evening with Vladimir Solovyov, which I caught after submitting my latest analysis of the Russian victory in Avdeevka, one panelist made a point about the significance of the win at Avdeevka that bears repeating here.
The conquest of Avdeevka overturned entirely the smug, face saving view of the conflict which General Zaluzhny prononounced in an interview with Western journalists at summer’s end when the failure of the Ukrainian Counter-offensive was fully evident. To the apparent consternation of Zelensky, the top Ukrainian military commander called the conflict with Russia ‘a stalemate,’ with neither side able to make serious territorial gains. This judgment was picked up with alacrity by the Western media and found special support among American ‘Progressives,’ who called for a cease-fire to be imposed from outside.
The wise men and women in America’s political circles like Katrina Vanden Heuvel, James Carden and Anatol Lieven reasoned that after months of fierce fighting, the line of contact between enemy forces had hardly budged. And so we were witnesses to a stalemate. They even discussed among themselves how much the Russians should pay in war reparations.
Those holding ‘dissident’ views, myself included, argued that Russia’s overarching strategy was not territorial gain but destruction of Ukraine’s fighting men and material in keeping with the principles of warfare set out more than a century ago by Clausewitz, after which movement on the ground would be swift and in Russia’s favor. This ‘dissident’ view is now vindicated.
The Solovyov show panelist went on to say that in the view of American military specialists Avdeevka was considered ‘untakeable.’ Hence the shock and awe that must be going on today within the halls of the Pentagon and at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The question for us all at present is whether in their shock and awe, and to cover their own asses, these U.S. and NATO commanders will not consider escalating the conflict yet again to re-gain the advantage on the Russians.
It is against this context that we must consider the pressure now being applied to German Chancellor Scholz to deliver to Kiev long range air-launched cruise missiles capable of striking well behind Russian lines. And please do remember that the loudest voices in German political elites calling for this are precisely within the Opposition CDU party, not from Annalena Baerbock and her fellow crazies among the Greens.
A test of Russia’s willingness to hit back in response to such escalation already took place yesterday when Ukrainian forces used American-supplied ground-launched Himars missiles to hit the central library and other civilian structures in the center of Donetsk city. These attacks using missiles that each cost $150,000 of U.S. taxpayer money had no military value whatsoever. They were deployed with terrorist intent to demonstrate Kiev’s ability to continue their murderous raids even after losing their main artillery base on Donetsk city in Avdeevka, 7 km distant.
I address peace-loving folks in Germany, in Romania, in Poland and elsewhere in NATO-land who do not want to be victims of a wider war that takes us to nuclear exchanges. I call upon them to consider that the Kremlin has indirectly, via state broadcasts like the Solovyov show, made clear its intent to destroy factories producing weapons like the Taurus at their source and to destroy air bases that are being used by Ukrainian aircraft to launch deadly attacks on the Russian homeland. With the Russian victory in Avdeevka against everything that NATO could deploy on the spot, the Alliance has lost its deterrent value.
©Gilbert Doctorow, 2024
“Those holding ‘dissident’ views, myself included, argued that Russia’s overarching strategy was not territorial gain but destruction of Ukraine’s fighting men and material in keeping with the principles of warfare set out more than a century ago by Clausewitz, after which movement on the ground would be swift and in Russia’s favor. This ‘dissident’ view is now vindicated.”
The general point is quite correct. One specifics not so. Clausewitz is not so relevant to Russian military strategy today. To a degree he was for the Russian theorist Svechin, writing his epic, Strategy, in the 1920’s. And, who yet retains a place in the upper levels of Russian military thinkers. It’s a brilliant book. But later Russian thinkers, Triandofilov, and notably Isserson really fleshed out what still applies to Rus strategy…namely Operational Art. Yes, territorial holdings is not the focus. Instead, ceding territory is fundamental tactics, as is the concept of Active Defense. Both tactic and concept was seen when RF forces retreated east of Kharkiv, as well as, south of Kherson. Both cases involved giving up territory in exchange for much better turf from which to defend, and most importantly to be able to supply, and then, to attrit the enemy. There’s very little reporting about the logistics of supplying an army, but if you read about the depth of organizational challenges to supply even a battalion sized group for a few days maneuver, it’s quite revealing. Western media hasn’t been able to see these Russian defensive minded repositions as other than weakness. It’s anbsurd. However, it is no secret to western military strategists, nor to curricula at their war colleges. There’s copious papers written about Russian military strategy which is still acknowledged to have been ahead of everyone else’s thinking, and which the west has in fact adopted parts of into their own doctrine.
The Russian tenets are well known. As you have correctly noted, it’s baked into Russian doctrine, axiomatic, that territorial advance is not as important as preservation of personnel & equipment, which also puts to rest the much reported (by western media) human wave RF meat assaults. It’s projecting on Russian what is in fact the story of UAF tactics. Not by choice, but as de facto feature of the UAF attempting frontal offensives on very heavily & deeply echeloned defensive positions without air support.
Russian strategists consider all aspects of the economy and population demographics and industrial capacities of themselves and potential enemies. One of the obvious points they have grappled with is how to defend an incredibly vast land mass with 1000’s of km of borders with a population base smaller than their prospective enemies, and as was the case emerging from the collapse of the ussr, a very depleted economy. When war planning, industrial capacity, population base, political stability, and food security are fundamental.
I’ve digressed, but all this stuff is germane to your “dissident” take. I would not describe it as dissident, rather it’s simply correct.